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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
[The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the 
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of May, 1930, have 
been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These 
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way 
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor, 
The Journal of Accountancy.]
Examination in Commercial Law
May 16, 1930, 9 A.M. to 12:30 P.M.
Group I
A nswer all questions in this group.
No. 1:
$5,000 No. 657
The First National Bank
Newark, N. J., Jan. 15, 1929.
E. R. Cater has deposited in this bank Five Thousand Dollars payable to the 
order of himself on the surrender of this certificate properly endorsed, with 
interest at 4^%-
J. H. Benedict, Cashier.
Is the foregoing a negotiable instrument? What is it called? What is its 
use?
Answer:
(a) The foregoing is a negotiable instrument, because it is a written uncondi­
tional promise by the bank to pay a sum certain in money, on demand, to the 
order of E. R. Cater.
(b) It is called a certificate of deposit.
(c) It serves as an acknowledgment by the bank of the receipt of a sum of 
money on deposit, which in this case the bank promises to pay to the order of 
the depositor, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and 
the depositor is created.
No. 2:
Jones decides to purchase a tractor for use on his farm. The George Tractor 
Company manufactures and markets a tractor under the trade name of “ Chal­
lenge Tractors.” Jones purchases a “ Challenge” tractor but after two weeks’ 
use he finds that it is not of sufficient power for his work because his farm is 
largely soft muck land used for raising market vegetables. He seeks to return 
the tractor and the George Tractor Company seeks to recover an unpaid 
balance of the purchase price. Which of them would succeed?
Answer:
The George Tractor Company would succeed in recovering the unpaid pur­
chase price. The sale could be rescinded only upon the theory of breach of an 
implied warranty of fitness. In the case of the sale of a specified article under 
its trade name, and in the absence of a reliance on the seller to furnish an article 
fit for a disclosed use, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any par­
ticular purpose for which the buyer intends to use it.
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No. 3:
Jones, Johnson and Perry form a partnership. Jones contributes $5,000, 
Johnson $3,000 and Perry $1,000. The partnership agreement omits any pro­
vision indicating how the profits are to be divided. If the business results in 
profit how will such profit be shared by the partners?
Answer:
In the absence of any agreement for division the profits of the partnership 
should be shared equally. The difference in contribution of capital may be 
offset by differences in services performed, and courts decline to look into the 
question of which partner may have made the greatest contribution.
No. 4:
A man dies on August 15, 1929. His estate is still in process of settlement on 
December 31, 1929. How is the income of the decedent and of his estate for 
1929 returned for federal income-tax purposes? What personal exemption 
would be allowed against the 1929 income of the decedent, his estate and his 
widow?
Answer:
The income of the decedent should have been returned by his executor or 
administrator on or before March 15, 1930. The income of his estate should 
likewise have been returned by his executor or administrator on or before 
March 15, 1930. The full personal exemption of $3,500 would be allowed 
against the 1929 income of the decedent. The full exemption of $1,500 would 
be allowed against the income of his estate. The full exemption of $1,500 or 
$3,500 would be allowed against the income of his widow, depending upon 
whether or not she was the head of a family at the close of the taxable year.
No. 5:
You become secretary of a large corporation and, among other duties, have 
charge of all transfers of the corporation’s stock. To safeguard the corporation 
what formalities would you require with reference to each certificate presented 
for transfer?
Answer:
I would insist on having a trust company appointed registrar and another 
trust company appointed transfer agent, and would turn the matter over to 
them. No large corporation should have the transfer of its stock handled by 
its secretary.
Group II
Answer any five of the questions in this group, but no more than five.
No. 6:
What is the distinction between insolvency laws and bankruptcy laws?
Answer:
The only distinction which now exists between insolvency laws and bank­
ruptcy laws is a matter of terminology; the term “bankruptcy act ” referring to 
the federal statute, and the term “insolvency statutes” referring to statutes of 
the several states.
No. 7:
The M Company, a boatbuilder, selected certain mahogany lumber in the Y 
Company’s yard and bought and paid for it. The Y Company agreed to load 
the lumber on a railroad freight car to be placed on the siding in its yard. 
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Before the Y Company had the opportunity to do so, the lumber was destroyed 
by a fire which was not due to any fault of the Y Company. On whom does the 
loss fall?
Answer:
The loss falls on the Y Company. The general rule is that a person having 
the title to the property bears the loss. Unless a contrary intention appears, 
where a contract for the sale of specific goods requires the seller to deliver such 
goods at a particular place, it is presumed under the uniform sales act that the 
parties do not intend that title should pass until such delivery is made. This is 
true even though the property has been paid for by the buyer. In the present 
case, the Y Company was required by contract to load the lumber on a freight 
car. This loading would be the delivery, and title did not pass until that was 
done. (In this answer I assume there is no particular significance in the word 
“bought” contained in the question. If the word “bought” implies a special 
contract by reason of which title passed the answer would be otherwise.)
No. 8:
Assume that in question No. 7 the Y Company had loaded the lumber on the 
freight car and had consigned the car to the M Company, but before the car 
was started on its journey fire had destroyed the car and its contents. Would 
there be any responsibility different from that developing from the conditions 
given in question 7 and, if so, why?
Answer:
On the principle stated in the preceding question, title passed from the Y 
Company to the M Company when the Y Company had loaded the lumber on 
the freight car. Therefore, as between the Y Company and the M Company, 
the M Company must bear the loss. But since the lumber had been consigned 
to the M Company, it was in the possession of the carrier, which, if it was a 
common carrier, would be liable for the loss of the lumber by the fire unless the 
fire was caused by an act of God or the public enemy. The fact that a railroad 
company does not own or control the siding on which it has placed its cars for 
the reception of freight but has furnished them to a shipper on a private switch, 
does not affect the carrier’s responsibility if the essential elements of a delivery 
otherwise are present.
No. 9:
Allen, by fraud, induces Bates to issue a negotiable promissory note to him. 
Allen then sells the note to Cameron, who is a holder in due course. Cameron, 
in turn, negotiates the note to Davis who, while not a party to the fraud, has 
full knowledge of it. Can Davis recover from Bates? State the rule involved 
and the reason for it.
Answer:
Davis can recover from Bates. A holder of a note who derives his title thereto 
through a holder in due course thereof and who is not himself a party to any 
fraud or illegality affecting the note has all the rights of the holder in due course 
in respect of all parties prior to the latter. The protection of the holder in due 
course against diminution of the market for the note is the reason for the rule.
No. 10:
The board of tax appeals, in a case known as “Matter of McNeil,” decided 
that commissions paid to brokers by owners for consummating leases of space in 
buildings are deductible in the year when paid, instead of in annual instalments 
spread over the terms of the leases as previously ruled by the commissioner of 
internal revenue. The commissioner announced his non-acquiescence in this 
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decision. What is the significance of this action and how would you advise a 
client to handle similar commissions in his income-tax return for 1929?
Answer:
The commissioner’s non-acquiescence in the board’s decision implies that he 
will not follow it in other cases involving that point, and that he will probably 
test the question in the courts. Pending such a final determination I should 
advise my client to follow the board’s decision and deduct the commissions in 
his return for 1929.
No. 11:
X, Y and Z entered into a partnership which, by the provisions of the partner­
ship agreement, was to continue for a term of three years. Z, however, during 
the first year disagreed many times with X and Y as to business policies, such 
disagreements resulting in strained personal relations between the partners. 
At the close of the first year X and Y decided to drop Z from the partnership 
and so informed him. Could X and Y compel Z to withdraw?
Answer:
X and Y can not compel Z to withdraw from the firm, the partners having 
agreed to continue the partnership for three years.
No. 12:
A owns 100 shares of stock of the X Steel Corporation. At a meeting of the 
board of directors held in January, 1929, a dividend was declared, payable 
April 1, 1929, to stockholders of record March 1, 1929. A died on March 15, 
1929, leaving a will under which everything that he owned at the time of his 
death was left in trust, the income thereof only to be paid to his wife during her 
life. When the dividend was paid to the executors on April 1, 1929, was it 
proper to treat it as part of the trust estate or as income payable to the wife? 
Answer:
It was proper to treat this dividend as a part of the trust estate. A being a 
stockholder of record March 1, 1929, was entitled to receive on April 1, 1929, a 
dividend on his 100 shares of stock of the X Steel Corporation. This made the 
X Steel Corporation the debtor of A on March 1, 1929, to the amount of the 
dividend, although it was not payable until later. This debt constituted a part 
of A’s estate.
No. 13:
The commissioner of internal revenue has ruled adversely to your conten­
tions on certain items of an income-tax return of your client and has assessed an 
additional tax. To what tribunals may the case be taken for review of the com­
missioner's action?
Answer:
The case may be taken to the board of tax appeals for a redetermination of 
the deficiency asserted by the commissioner. The decision of the board may 
be reviewed by a circuit court of appeals or the court of appeals of the District 
of Columbia, in accordance with section 1002 of the revenue act of 1926. The 
decision of either of these courts may be reviewed by the supreme court of the 
United States upon certiorari. If the additional tax has been paid, then the 
taxpayer may after filing a claim for refund sue in a district court of the United 
States or in the court of claims for its recovery. Such suit can be instituted six 
months after the claim is filed or immediately after its rejection by the com­
missioner. A decision of a district court may be reviewed by the circuit court 
of appeals and in turn by the supreme court of the United States on certiorari. 
A decision of the court of claims may be reviewed by the supreme court of the 
United States upon certiorari.
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